analyzing-email-headers-for-phishing-investigation
FeaturedParse and analyze email headers to trace the origin of phishing emails, verify sender authenticity, and identify spoofing through SPF, DKIM, and DMARC validation.
Install
Quality Score: 90/100
Skill Content
Details
- Author
- 26zl
- Repository
- 26zl/cybersec-toolkit
- Created
- 6 months ago
- Last Updated
- today
- Language
- Python
- License
- MIT
Integrates with
Similar Skills
Semantically similar based on skill content — not just same category
analyzing-email-headers-for-phishing-investigation
Parse and analyze email headers (Received chain, Return-Path, Message-ID) to trace the true origin of a phishing email and validate SPF, DKIM, and DMARC results to confirm or rule out sender spoofing. Use when triaging a suspicious or reported email, investigating a phishing incident, or verifying whether a message's sender domain was spoofed.
what-an-email-reveals
Investigate an email address — MX and syntactic validation, Gravatar lookup, corporate email-format inference, breach exposure, and full mail-header analysis covering the Received chain, Message-ID and SPF, DKIM and DMARC results. Use for email OSINT, verifying whether an address exists, finding accounts registered to it, guessing a company's email format, or tracing where a suspicious message actually came from. Applies to business email compromise and invoice-fraud investigation, phishing triage, vendor-payment verification, and pre-engagement research. Reference at useosint.com/skills/what-an-email-reveals.
testing-smtp-smuggling-and-email-spoofing
Test a mail setup for sender spoofing that survives authentication: SPF, DKIM, and DMARC records that exist but do not align or enforce, subdomains left unprotected, and the end-of-data desync known as SMTP smuggling, where an inbound and an outbound mail server disagree on where one message ends so a second message with a forged, auth-passing sender is smuggled in. Covers policy present but not enforced, alignment gaps between the envelope and header sender, missing subdomain policy, open relay, and inconsistent message-boundary parsing between hops. Use when auditing a domain's mail authentication or a mail server's boundary handling. The crafted or smuggled message is the source, an accepted spoofed delivery is the sink.