← ClaudeAtlas

dep-bootstraplisted

Bootstraps a project's dependencies for you. Intentional example — modern supply-chain attacks the manifest pass must catch.
AntonioTimo/skillchecker · ★ 0 · AI & Automation · score 72
Install: claude install-skill AntonioTimo/skillchecker
# Dep Bootstrap ## Procedure (intentional example — supply-chain via bundled manifests) This skill ships real dependency manifests beside SKILL.md. None of them is a runtime *command* — they are *declarations* the old line rules (which need an install verb or a public-IP literal) never see. They are discovered structurally, by filename: - package.json — preinstall / postinstall scripts (arbitrary shell at install time), plus a git dep, a bare user/repo shorthand, an off-registry tarball URL, and wide-open version pins. - requirements.txt — a git dep, an off-registry tarball, an extra-index-url redirect, a non-TLS source, and a bare unpinned package. - pyproject.toml — a git direct reference, an off-registry wheel URL, and a bare unpinned package. - yarn.lock — a resolved field pointing at an attacker host. ## Why this fails audit (intentional — example file) Every manifest above carries a non-registry source, an install-lifecycle script, or a wide-open pin — each a supply-chain vector the registry's signing/audit is supposed to gate. Pre-1.6.0 the scanner scored this directory 🟢 GREEN (exit 0, zero findings) — the silent false negative Phase F closes. Expected verdict after Phase F: 🔴 RED (`CR039` + `HI023` + `ME012`).