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prompt-injection-auditlisted

Audit an AI system you own or are authorized to test for prompt-injection and tool-poisoning vulnerabilities, then produce a prioritized findings report with concrete mitigations. Covers system prompts, tool/function descriptions, RAG and retrieval pipelines, MCP server integrations, and multi-turn agent flows. Use this skill whenever the user wants to security-review, red-team, threat-model, pen-test, or "check for injection" on an LLM app, agent, chatbot, RAG system, or MCP setup — or asks "is my agent vulnerable to prompt injection?", "audit my system prompt", "review my tool definitions for tool poisoning", or "harden my AI pipeline". Frame every engagement as authorized defensive testing of the user's own system.
Itachi3355/prompt-injection-audit · ★ 0 · AI & Automation · score 70
Install: claude install-skill Itachi3355/prompt-injection-audit
# Prompt-Injection Audit Help a developer find and fix prompt-injection weaknesses in an AI system they own or are authorized to test. The output is a **Findings Report** modeled on a professional security assessment: each finding has a category, severity, evidence, and a concrete fix. ## Authorized-use boundary (read first) This skill is for **defensive testing of the user's own system**. It maps attack *surfaces* and provides *probe templates* that reveal whether a defense holds — the same way a penetration-testing framework works. It does **not**: - Produce turnkey jailbreaks tuned to defeat a specific named production model or a third party's system. - Help exfiltrate data, escalate privilege, or attack infrastructure the user doesn't control. If a request shifts from "test my system" to "help me break into someone else's," stop and say so plainly. Confirm scope up front: *"I'll treat this as authorized testing of your own system — is that right?"* When in doubt, keep probes illustrative (do they bypass the guardrail: yes/no) rather than weaponized. ## Workflow ### Step 1 — Map the attack surface Inventory where untrusted text can reach the model. Ask for (or read from provided files) whichever apply: - **System prompt** — the instructions the developer wrote. - **Tool / function definitions** — names, descriptions, parameter docs (a common tool-poisoning vector). - **Retrieval sources** — RAG documents, web fetches, database fields, anything the model reads at r