security-auditlisted

# Security Audit v3.7 ## 0. Methodology — Two Layers (audit-067 C-10) This skill runs **two complementary layers**; neither substitutes for the other: 1. **Deterministic floor (§2)** — regex patterns + external scanners. Reproducible, cheap, CI-gateable (`--fail-on`), zero judgment. It is a *floor*, not the audit: a clean scan is **not** clearance, because regex is categorically blind to semantic classes — business-logic authz, cross-file taint flows, semantic MCP tool-description poisoning (§3 Agentic limitation note). 2. **LLM semantic pass (§3–§4)** — long-context taint/logic review against the checklists plus threat modeling: the layer that catches what regex cannot. Frontier evidence that LLM-driven semantic review finds real vulnerabilities beyond pattern matching: DARPA AIxCC finals (2025), Google Big Sleep, Codex Security / Claude Code Security review agents (full citations: audit-067 §Bibliography). > **Licensing footnote (semgrep):** the open-source offering is **Semgrep CE** since the Dec 2024 licensing change; **Opengrep** (community fork, Jan 2025) is a drop-in alternative where CE constraints matter. The external-tool roster treats either as the same scanner slot. ## 1. Red Flags (Anti-Rationalization) **STOP and READ THIS if you are thinking:** - "I'll skip the script because I just checked the code manually" -> **WRONG**. Humans miss regex patterns. **EXECUTE** the script. - "I have no way to run it, so I'll write down what it would have said" -> **WRONG,