shell-safety-reviewlisted

Before executing a shell command that was generated (by yourself or another model) rather than typed by a human in the moment, scan it for these red flags and stop to confirm with the user if any are present: - **Recursive/forced deletion**: `rm -rf`, `rm -f *`, `find ... -delete`, emptying a trash/cache directory that wasn't explicitly named by the user. - **Overwrite-in-place without a check**: `> file` (truncates silently), `mv` over an existing path, `git checkout -- .` / `git reset --hard` / `git clean -fd` (discards uncommitted work) — verify there's nothing uncommitted worth keeping first (`git status`, `git stash` if unsure). - **Wide-scope operations**: a glob or wildcard that could match more than the intended target (`chmod -R`, `chown -R`, `rm dir/*` from the wrong cwd) — print `pwd` and `ls` the target first if there's any ambiguity. - **Credentials/secrets in plain sight**: a command that echoes, logs, or commits an API key, token, or password — redact or route through a secret manager instead. - **Network calls to non-obvious hosts**: `curl`/`wget` piped straight into `sh`/`bash` (`curl ... | sh`), or a request to a host the user never mentioned — read the script first instead of blind-piping. - **Force-push or history rewrite**: `git push --force` (especially to `main`/`master`), `git rebase` on a shared branch, `--no-verify` to skip hooks — these need explicit human sign-off, not a "looked right" pass. - **Background/detached processe