ultrasafe-ai-llm-redteam
SolidPre-release simulated penetration testing from the AI/LLM red-team perspective — direct/indirect prompt injection, model extraction, jailbreak, hallucination-leverage, agentic misalignment, alignment-faking probe. Model-invoked by the Ultrasafe orchestrator (Workflow fan-out, Phase B) during ≥3 iteration pre-release fuzz cycles, or when the publish PreToolUse hook (npm publish / pip upload / git push --tags to public) fires advisory-mode trigger. Emits findings via ULTRASAFE_FINDING A2A intent (Constellation §13.16) with `value.advisory: true` in v0.2.x (report-only, no publish block). Skip for purely local dev runs without LLM-integrated surface.
Install
Quality Score: 81/100
Skill Content
Details
- Author
- SoliEstre
- Repository
- SoliEstre/EstreGenesis
- Created
- 2 months ago
- Last Updated
- today
- Language
- JavaScript
- License
- Apache-2.0
Integrates with
Similar Skills
Semantically similar based on skill content — not just same category
ultrasafe-web-api-attacker
Pre-release simulated penetration testing from the OWASP Top 10 / API contract / auth-bypass / SQLi / XSS / SSRF / CSRF / open-redirect / IDOR attacker perspective. Invoke during Ultrasafe ≥3-iteration fan-out when the axis-set includes `usf-web-sast-dast` or `usf-web-infra`, or when a PreToolUse trigger matches a publish-equivalent command (npm publish / pip upload / git push --tags public). Emits `ULTRASAFE_FINDING` A2A intent per finding (Constellation §13.16) with OSCAL-aligned payload + attack-path-graph flat-list candidate. v0.2.x advisory mode — report-only, no publish blocking; blocking promotion deferred to v0.3+.
ultrasafe-social-engineer
Pre-release security testing — simulated penetration from the social-engineering / human-factor attacker perspective. Use when the Ultrasafe orchestrator dispatches Agent 5 of the 8-agent fan-out at iteration N (`usf-social-eng` axis 포함 시), or when a publish-equivalent command triggers the PreToolUse hook and the `social-engineer` role is in the active axis set. Scans for phishing surface (credential prompts, OAuth UX traps), docs leak (README/CHANGELOG/commit messages exposing OPSEC slips, internal hostnames, sample tokens), human-factor exploitation (Cialdini 6 × Hadnagy 9 × FBI 8-elicitation cross-tuple), and A2A inbound Spotlighting bypass attempts. Emits findings via `ULTRASAFE_FINDING` Constellation intent (§13.16) — advisory mode in v0.2.x (report-only, publish 차단 없음). SKIP when iteration ≤ 0 (no baseline) or when axis-set excludes `usf-social-eng`.
ultrasafe-threat-model-lifecycle
Pre-release simulated penetration testing from the threat modeling (STRIDE/PASTA) + incident lifecycle + disclosure timing attacker perspective. Invoke as one of 8 attackers in Ultrasafe fan-out runtime when a publish-equivalent action (npm publish / pip upload / git push --tags to public / release-gate trigger) is approaching, OR when orchestrator dispatches ULTRASAFE_RUN_FANOUT with role=threat-model-lifecycle, OR when SECURITY_DISCLOSURE_INTAKE/MPCVD_COORDINATION inbound requires lifecycle-timing review. Emits ULTRASAFE_FINDING via Constellation §13.16 (advisory mode in v0.2.x — report-only, no publish blocking). Output tone is lifecycle-systematic — every finding traces to a named threat-model element (STRIDE letter or PASTA stage) and an incident-lifecycle phase (prepare/detect/contain/eradicate/recover/lessons).