auditing-editor-extension-workspace-trustlisted
Install: claude install-skill UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills
# Auditing editor extension workspace trust: what an untrusted repository makes the editor do on open
An editor extension turns dangerous the moment merely opening a cloned repository makes it run code the
repository controls. The threat is not a user choosing to run something; it is a drive-by, a hostile
`.vscode/tasks.json`, a `settings.json` that names the compiler binary, an activation event that fires on
folder open and shells out before the user has trusted anything. You audit it by resolving, per risky
action, whether a workspace-trust gate or an explicit user gesture stands between the untrusted repo and
the execution sink. The discipline is separating an action that genuinely fires on open from one that
needs a deliberate click, and a value read from workspace settings from one read from user or global
settings a repo cannot set.
## When to use
- You are reviewing an editor or IDE extension manifest, its activation events, and its trust capability.
- The extension reads workspace configuration, runs tasks, or resolves a tool or binary path from a repo.
- You want to know whether opening a hostile repository executes code before the user trusts it.
## Scope check
Audit only extensions you own or are authorized to assess, and open a crafted hostile workspace only on a
machine and account in scope, an auto-executed task runs real code on your host. Adjudicate on the
manifest and the handler. If you can't name the authorization, stop.
## The loop
1. **Resolve the