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auditing-electron-ipc-trustlisted

Audit an Electron desktop app for untrusted renderer content that reaches a Node or operating-system capability, after the webPreferences and the preload bridge surface are resolved. Covers nodeIntegration enabled with contextIsolation off, a preload that exposes raw ipcRenderer or a generic invoke passthrough, an ipcMain handler that trusts renderer input as a path, command, or URL, remote or attacker-influenced content loaded through loadURL with navigation unlocked, shell.openExternal called on a renderer-controlled string, and a custom protocol or deeplink routed into a privileged action without validation. Use when reviewing webPreferences, the preload and contextBridge surface, IPC handlers, and remote-content loading, not renderer-side markup injection the client-side DOM skill owns. Untrusted content in a renderer is the source, a Node or operating-system capability is the sink, and input crossing the bridge without validation while isolation is off is the bug.
UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills · ★ 27 · AI & Automation · score 80
Install: claude install-skill UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills
# Auditing Electron IPC trust: when renderer content reaches a native capability An Electron app is dangerous where content in a renderer, whether remote, injected through a cross-site-scripting, or arriving over a custom protocol, reaches a Node or operating-system capability. The marquee chain is a renderer bug escalating to code execution because the renderer can require Node directly, or because the preload bridge hands untrusted input to a native call. You audit it by resolving, per native sink, whether context isolation and the sandbox stand between the renderer and Node and whether the preload and IPC surface validate what they pass. The single most important false-positive killer is that context isolation and the sandbox being on make an otherwise alarming exposed symbol harmless, so resolve those two settings before judging any bridge. Renderer-side markup injection itself belongs to the client-side DOM skill; this skill owns the bridge and the IPC substrate. ## When to use - You are reviewing an Electron app's window configuration, its preload scripts, and its IPC handlers. - You see webPreferences, a contextBridge exposure, an ipcMain handler, or a loadURL or openExternal call. - You want to know whether untrusted renderer content can reach a Node or operating-system capability. ## Scope check Audit only apps you own or are authorized to assess, and drive a renderer-to-main path only against a build in scope, an IPC handler that reaches a shell or the filesyst