agent-security-boundarylisted

# Agent Security Boundary Prevent agent workflows from widening permissions, leaking data, or trusting hostile context. ## Scope Use for the task in the description. For example: Review a tool that executes commands extracted from uploaded documents. Do not activate for: Rename a local helper without changing tool or data access. ## Workflow 1. Map every tool, file, network, and external-state boundary. 2. Classify data sensitivity and untrusted inputs. 3. Identify how prompt injection or misleading context could steer tool use. 4. Check approval gates for destructive, permission-widening, or external-send actions. 5. Recommend guardrails, rejection, or targeted validation before merge. ## Evidence Tool, file, network, or permission surfaces touched. Data sensitivity and trust boundaries. User approvals or destructive action requirements. Prompt-injection and untrusted-content exposure. Report the outcome with relevant workflow, tools and data, trust boundaries, prompt-injection risks. Adapt the format to the task; omit empty fields. Never claim checks ran without observed results. ## Boundaries Keep secrets and private records out of shared artifacts. Use redacted or synthetic evidence. External sends, publication, destructive operations and permission widening need explicit authorization; reuse authorization already given for the action. Continue authorized read-only and reversible local work through the requested outcome. If evidence is missing, inspect available