threat-modelinglisted

# Threat modeling References: - <https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/develop/threat-modeling-tool-threats> — STRIDE categories. - <https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/develop/threat-modeling-tool-getting-started> — the SDL process. - <https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/larryosterman/threat-modeling-again-what-does-stride-have-to-do-with-threat-modeling> — STRIDE-per-element. - <https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/larryosterman/threat-modeling-again-stride-mitigations> — mitigation classes. A threat model answers what an attacker can do to a design, before the design ships. STRIDE is the categorisation that turns that open question into a finite checklist: for a given design the threats are static, so walking every element against the categories that apply to it terminates. Work from the design. Engineers know their own system better than they know what an attacker wants from it, and the element walk reaches the same threats without that guess. ## Input The model is a data flow diagram with trust boundaries drawn. Its element list is the enumeration checklist and its element names are the threat table's row keys, so the diagram has to exist first — invoke the `dfd` skill when it doesn't. ## Categories | Category | Violates | Is | | --- | --- | --- | | **S**poofing | Authenticity | Using another party's identity — credentials, a signature, an address | | **T**ampering | Integrity | Malicious modification of data, at res