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ctf-crypto-attackslisted

Cryptographic attack decision tree for CTF crypto. Load for any crypto challenge to identify the primitive (RSA, AES, ECC, DH, hash, PRNG) and select the matching attack. Covers RSA (small e, Wiener, common modulus, Coppersmith, Fermat), AES oracles (ECB, CBC padding, CTR/GCM nonce reuse), ECDSA nonce reuse, LCG/MT state recovery, and hash length extension.
bilal-spotted/claude-code-ctf-rig · ★ 3 · Web & Frontend · score 71
Install: claude install-skill bilal-spotted/claude-code-ctf-rig
# CTF Crypto Attack Decision Tree IDENTIFY the primitive and parameters FIRST. Never code before naming the weakness. ## RSA (you have n, e, c, maybe more) - e = 3 (or small) and m^e < n: cube-root the ciphertext. - e = 3 across 3 recipients, same m: Hastad broadcast (CRT + root). - Same n, two e (gcd(e1,e2)=1): common modulus attack. - e very large / d small: Wiener (continued fractions), or Boneh-Durfee. - p, q close: Fermat factorization. - Known high/low bits of p, or stereotyped message: Coppersmith (use sage small_roots). - n factorable / known: try factordb, then d = inverse(e, phi). - Decryption/parity oracle: LSB oracle -> recover m by halving. - Partial private key leak: recover with lattice. ## AES / block ciphers - Same block -> same ciphertext (ECB): detect duplicate blocks; byte-at-a- time decryption if you control a prefix; cut-and-paste for structured. - CBC + padding error distinguishable: padding oracle -> decrypt any block. - CBC + you want to flip plaintext bits: bit-flipping via prev ciphertext. - CTR/GCM with repeated nonce: keystream reuse -> XOR out; GCM nonce reuse also leaks the auth key (forbidden attack). ## ECC / DH / ECDSA - Smooth group order: Pohlig-Hellman for discrete log. - Small subgroup / invalid curve: send crafted points to leak key mod small primes. - ECDSA repeated nonce k (same r in two sigs): recover k then private key. - Singular/anomalous curve: specialized dlog (Smart's attack for trace-1 / p-adic). ## PRNG / stream