constant-time-analysislisted

# Constant-Time Analysis Compile the code, inspect the emitted assembly or bytecode for variable-time instructions, then decide which of the flagged operations actually touch secrets. The compilation step is mechanical; the triage step is the work. ## When to Use - Implementing or reviewing a signature, encryption, KEM, or key derivation routine - Code applies `/` or `%` to a value derived from a key, plaintext, nonce, or token - The user mentions "constant-time", "timing attack", "side-channel", or "KyberSlash" - Reviewing functions named `sign`, `verify`, `encrypt`, `decrypt`, `derive_key` ## When NOT to Use - **Measuring** timing variance on a running binary — use the `constant-time-testing` skill from the `testing-handbook-skills` plugin, which covers dudect and statistical approaches and may not be installed. This skill inspects compiler output statically and never executes the code under test. - Non-cryptographic code, or crypto code where every input is public - High-level API usage where a vetted library owns the constant-time guarantees - Cache and other microarchitectural side channels — the assembly view cannot see them ## Language Routing Read the guide for the target language before interpreting any findings; each one lists that language's dangerous instructions and the idiomatic constant-time replacements. | Guide | Languages | | ----- | --------- | | [references/compiled.md](references/compiled.md) | C, C++, Go, Rust | | [references/swift.md](references