← ClaudeAtlas

trust-issueslisted

Adversarial, attacker-minded security review of ANY untrusted code before you trust it — a GitHub repo, a Claude/agent skill, an MCP server, a plugin, an npm or pip package, or a snippet you are about to base your own skill on. ALWAYS run this BEFORE installing a skill or plugin, BEFORE connecting an MCP server, BEFORE running or importing third-party code, and BEFORE copying external code into a skill you are authoring. Trigger whenever the user says "is this repo safe", "check this skill/plugin/MCP for malware", "review before I install", "audit this code", "can I trust this", or asks you to clone, install, or build on someone else's repo. Assume the code is hostile until the review says otherwise.
howshannon/trust-issues · ★ 5 · AI & Automation · score 75
Install: claude install-skill howshannon/trust-issues
# Trust Issues An adversarial security review for untrusted code. The job is to surface everything that could reasonably concern a security expert, rather than to sign off on the code as safe. Approach it like an attacker first and a defender second, and stay skeptical throughout. ## Why this exists (and its honest limits) Agent skills, MCP servers, and plugins are just code plus natural-language instructions that an AI will read and often execute. A malicious one can steal credentials, exfiltrate files, or hijack the agent through instructions hidden in a `SKILL.md`. Real campaigns have shipped hundreds of malicious skills that installed info-stealers on victims' machines. Be clear-eyed about what a scan can and cannot do. Published research shows that signature-based skill scanners are **routinely evaded** — the same malware reshaped to look benign slipped past eight popular scanners across ~1,600 real malicious skills. So the pattern scan here is the *floor*, not the ceiling. Your real defenses, in order, are: **(1) don't run untrusted code outside a sandbox, (2) least privilege — never give an agent both the untrusted code and access to your secrets, network, and files at once, and (3) adversarial human/LLM reasoning about intent.** A grep that finds nothing changes none of that. ## The one rule that matters most **Reviewing is not running.** Cloning/reading is safe; executing is not. During this review, never run the target's code, never `npm install` / `pip instal