lh-llm-integrationlisted
Install: claude install-skill jrodrigopuca/local-agents
## Critical Patterns
### 1. Treat the LLM as an unreliable external dependency
It's a network call to a probabilistic service that can be slow, wrong,
malformed, or down. Engineer accordingly: constrain the output at generation
when the API offers it (structured outputs, a schema the model must satisfy)
and validate it anyway before trusting it — an LLM promising JSON is not JSON
until parsed; handle timeouts and failures gracefully; and never let its raw
output reach a dangerous sink (a database, a shell, the DOM, a tool call)
unchecked. Everything the model READS is input from whoever wrote it — a
document, a ticket, a web page, a tool result — and instructions hidden in
that input are the attack ([security/lh-threat-modeling](../../../security/skills/lh-threat-modeling/SKILL.md)
maps it; [lh-code-audit](../../../security/skills/lh-code-audit/SKILL.md) hunts it).
Data is never promoted to instructions, whatever it says. "The model usually
returns the right format" is a production incident scheduled for later.
### 2. Prompts are code — versioned, reviewed, tested
A prompt is program logic expressed in English; treat it like source: in
version control (not pasted in a dashboard), reviewed, and changed
deliberately because a wording tweak can shift behavior across all users.
"Prompt engineering" by editing production text and eyeballing a few outputs is
how you ship a regression to everyone. Structure prompts for maintainability:
clear instructions, examples where they ear