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container-k8s-pentestlisted

Use when testing container and Kubernetes security — image and registry weaknesses, insecure container configuration (privileged, host mounts, capabilities), container escape, Kubernetes RBAC and API-server exposure, secrets handling, network policy gaps, and pod-to-cluster privilege escalation. Maps to MITRE ATT&CK Containers and CIS benchmarks. Authorized engagements only.
noahfranklin/gideon · ★ 2 · DevOps & Infrastructure · score 70
Install: claude install-skill noahfranklin/gideon
# Container & Kubernetes Penetration Testing Security assessment of container images and orchestration. Mapped to **MITRE ATT&CK (Containers)** and CIS Docker/Kubernetes benchmarks. ## 0. Authorization gate - [ ] Written scope: clusters/namespaces, registries, allowed intensity. - [ ] Prod vs non-prod boundaries; no disruption to running workloads unless cleared. ## 1. Images & registry - Scan images for known-vuln packages, embedded secrets, and excessive contents. - Registry exposure/auth: anonymous pull/push, unsigned images. - **Fix:** minimal/base images, image scanning in CI, signing + admission control, no secrets in layers. ## 2. Container configuration - **Dangerous settings:** `--privileged`, host PID/network/IPC, host path mounts (esp. docker socket), added Linux capabilities, running as root. - **Fix:** drop capabilities, non-root, read-only FS, no host mounts, seccomp/AppArmor, Pod Security Standards. ## 3. Container escape (in scope) - Assess escape feasibility from misconfig (privileged/host-mount/socket) or kernel vulns → host compromise. - **Fix:** the config hardening above; keep host/kernel patched; isolate workloads. ## 4. Kubernetes control plane - **API server exposure** and anonymous/weak auth. - **RBAC review:** over-permissive roles/bindings, wildcard verbs/resources, `cluster-admin` sprawl, service-account token abuse. - **etcd** exposure (holds all secrets). - **Kubelet** exposure (can allow command exec in pods). - **Fix:** authn/authz on all