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spring-ai-securitylisted

Use when threat-modeling or hardening a Spring AI RAG, chat, or tool-calling workflow against prompt injection, unauthorized actions, data exposure, or unbounded execution. Ordinary model-provider integration alone does not require this review.
rrezartprebreza/spring-boot-skills · ★ 357 · AI & Automation · score 89
Install: claude install-skill rrezartprebreza/spring-boot-skills
# Spring AI Security ## Version boundary Target Spring Boot 3 and the project's compatible Spring AI 1.x line. Preserve the repository's managed coordinates and provider choices. The Java 17 tool boundary here is deliberately independent of Spring AI APIs. Wire it into the selected version's tool mechanism and verify that adapter separately. ## Establish the trust boundary Map user input, uploaded documents, retrieved chunks, memory, tool output and rendered model responses. All can contain attacker-controlled content. A prompt instruction such as "ignore malicious text", a delimiter, classifier or keyword denylist is not an authorization boundary. Record what the model can read and which effects its tools can cause. - Derive caller and tenant from verified server-side identity, not prompts, model arguments or an arbitrary client header. Scope retrieval in the storage query and recheck authorization before returning documents; output-only filtering is too late. - Enforce the same ACLs during ingestion, vector retrieval, document lookup and cache/memory reuse. Bind conversation IDs to caller/tenant authorization; randomness alone is insufficient. - Expose narrowly typed tools, not shell execution, raw SQL, arbitrary URLs or general admin APIs. Validate arguments and enforce permissions in application code immediately before effects. - Require a trusted approval flow for sensitive writes: bind approval to actor, tenant, exact normalized action/arguments, expiry a