← ClaudeAtlas

isolate-clilisted

Run a third-party CLI as a subprocess without leaking into it or leaving state on the host, and prove both. Use when a script or skill shells out to an external tool, when a run must leave no trace outside the repository, when private input (a diff, a prompt, a credential) must not reach the tool's session log, when a policy or deny-list handed to the tool must actually be in force, when a claim about the tool's own behaviour (which paths it searches, which config file wins) must be settled against the shipped binary or bundle rather than its documentation, or before a measurement series whose runs must be comparable. Covers behaviour and state roots read out of the installed binary or bundle, a snapshot-diff-prune harness proven able to go red, and policy rules validated offline. Do NOT use to investigate an external system in general (that is research-it, which delegates here for artifacts on disk) or to judge whether a green result counts as evidence (that is prove-checks).
sergeyklay/.agents · ★ 5 · AI & Automation · score 80
Install: claude install-skill sergeyklay/.agents
# Confine an External CLI A CLI invoked as a subprocess is not a function call. It reads the operator's global configuration, writes per-run state under the home directory keyed to the directory it ran in, and treats a config file it cannot compile as advice rather than as an instruction. None of those three shows up in an exit code: the private content piped in lands in a plaintext log outside the repository, the host accumulates state nobody audits, and the confinement believed to be in force is absent. This skill is the mechanics of running such a tool and being able to say afterwards what it read, what it wrote, and what it left behind. Whether the run's *result* is evidence is a separate question and belongs to `prove-checks`. ## Trigger - A script or skill invokes a third-party CLI as a subprocess: an agent CLI, a linter with a cache, a package manager, a formatter, anything with a state store outside the working directory. - A second tool or provider branch is added to a script that already does this. - The tool is handed a policy, deny-list, allow-list or sandbox configuration. - The content piped in is private: an unmerged diff, a prompt, a credential, customer data. - A measurement or benchmark series will invoke the tool repeatedly and the runs have to be comparable to each other. Not this skill: reading the tool's behavior to answer a general question, which is `research-it`, or deciding whether the green that came out counts as proof, which is `prove-checks`