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kintsugi-security-zerotrustlisted

Focused security-zerotrust anti-patterns and verified code templates compiled by Kintsugi Harness.
tunguyen1993/kintsugi-harness · ★ 0 · AI & Automation · score 73
Install: claude install-skill tunguyen1993/kintsugi-harness
# kintsugi-security-zerotrust (`@KML/1` Machine-Native AST-IR) ```bash kintsugi scan --staged --fail-on HIGH ``` ## `@KML/1` Symbolic Guardrail Specifications (`NEG_AST => POS_AST`) ### `KL-ZTR-002` · `Cross-Layer Path Seam Containment: Never concatenate unvalidated user filenames into open()` - `@WIRE`: `@KML/1|id=KL-ZTR-002|sev=C|cat=security-zerotrust|lang=py|op=CROSS-LAYER_PATH_SEAM_CONTAINMENT_NE|guard=RX#649853b2|neg=«fh = open(base_dir + "/" + user_filename, "rb") # UNSAFE_PATH_CONCAT_SEAM»|pos=«target = (Path(base_dir) / user_filename).resolve() ; assert target.is_relative_to(Path(ba»|fp=db4f1888387de259` - `@TRAP`: `[Cognitive Trap] Assumed a surface string filter on a user filename prevents directory traversal when concatenated via `open(base_dir + '/' + filename)`.` - `@LAW`: `[Mental Model] Surface string filters fail against encoding/traversal seams across layers; resolve the canonical path via `Path(base_dir).joinpath(filename).resolve()` and enforce `.is_relative_to(base_root)` before opening.` `@NEG_AST` (`❌ FORBIDDEN`): ```python fh = open(base_dir + "/" + user_filename, "rb") # UNSAFE_PATH_CONCAT_SEAM ``` `@POS_AST` (`✅ REQUIRED`): ```python target = (Path(base_dir) / user_filename).resolve() assert target.is_relative_to(Path(base_dir).resolve()) fh = target.open("rb") ``` ### `KL-ZTR-003` · `Anti-Mass-Assignment Privilege Boundary: Never merge raw request dicts into user/account records` - `@WIRE`: `@KML/1|id=KL-ZTR-003|sev=C|cat=security-zerotrust|