defend-ai-agentslisted
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# Securing Tool-Calling AI Agents - Detection and Containment
A chatbot that gets prompt-injected says something wrong. An agent that gets prompt-injected does something wrong: it sends the email, runs the query, moves the money. The moment you give a model tools, its output stops being text and becomes actions, and the security boundary moves from "what can it say" to "what can it do." This skill is defensive: it describes the agent attack surface only as far as a defender needs to log, detect, and contain it, and ships no injection payloads, jailbreak strings, or evasion techniques.
## TL;DR for defenders
An agent is an LLM in a loop with tools, and its tool calls are where impact lives. Treat every tool call as a privileged action, not a chat message. You cannot patch prompt injection, so design for the assumption that the agent will eventually follow a hostile instruction and limit what that costs. The four controls that matter most: **scope every tool to the task** (least privilege beats excessive agency), **put a human in front of consequential, irreversible actions**, **enforce policy on tool calls outside the model** (a system prompt is guidance, not a boundary), and **give the agent its own scoped identity** rather than the user's full token. Log every tool call - that is your process-creation telemetry. The highest-precision detection below is rule 1, the out-of-profile tool call against a tight per-agent capability profile; rule 2, a consequential action right a