defend-jwtlisted
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# JWT Forgery and Verification Bypass - Defensive Methodology
> **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the log sources and signals, and the hardening, and points to public rule sources. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet.
## TL;DR
JWT bypasses almost always live in the verification step, not the token. Log the decoded JWT header `alg` and `kid` and the validation outcome at whatever component actually verifies the signature (API gateway, auth middleware, or app), then alert on three things: a header with `alg` set to `none`/`None`/`NONE` or empty, an `alg` that disagrees with what this issuer is supposed to use (an `HS256` token where you only ever issue `RS256` is the key-confusion tell), and a burst of signature-verification failures from one source or against one account. Harden by pinning an explicit algorithm allowlist, keeping signing-key material separated by algorithm, validating `iss`/`aud`/`exp`/`nbf` server-side on every request, and rotating keys on a schedule with a `kid` header.
## What it looks like, defender view
A forged token is designed to look ordinary, so the signal is in the header and the verification result rather than the payload. In `alg:none`, the attacker