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defend-jwtlisted

Defensive methodology against JSON Web Token (JWT) forgery and verification bypass: the alg:none downgrade, RS256-to-HS256 key confusion, unverified signatures, and missing claim checks that let an attacker mint a token your app will trust (MITRE ATT&CK T1606 Forge Web Credentials, then T1550.001 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token). Signals live in application and API-gateway logs, WAF logs, and auth-service logs: the decoded JWT header alg and kid, the iss/aud/exp claims, and signature-verification failures. This skill gives the defender view of each bypass, the exact fields to log and alert on, a hypothesis-driven hunt, and library and key-management hardening mapped to ISO 27001:2022 and NIST CSF 2.0. Use when hardening JWT or bearer-token validation, reviewing a JWT auth flow, hunting for alg:none or key-confusion forgery, triaging a spike in JWT signature failures, or deciding how to rotate signing keys.
umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue · ★ 0 · AI & Automation · score 62
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# JWT Forgery and Verification Bypass - Defensive Methodology > **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the log sources and signals, and the hardening, and points to public rule sources. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet. ## TL;DR JWT bypasses almost always live in the verification step, not the token. Log the decoded JWT header `alg` and `kid` and the validation outcome at whatever component actually verifies the signature (API gateway, auth middleware, or app), then alert on three things: a header with `alg` set to `none`/`None`/`NONE` or empty, an `alg` that disagrees with what this issuer is supposed to use (an `HS256` token where you only ever issue `RS256` is the key-confusion tell), and a burst of signature-verification failures from one source or against one account. Harden by pinning an explicit algorithm allowlist, keeping signing-key material separated by algorithm, validating `iss`/`aud`/`exp`/`nbf` server-side on every request, and rotating keys on a schedule with a `kid` header. ## What it looks like, defender view A forged token is designed to look ordinary, so the signal is in the header and the verification result rather than the payload. In `alg:none`, the attacker