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defend-llm-top-10listed

Defensive playbook for the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2025), centered on prompt injection (MITRE ATLAS AML.T0051, direct and indirect; MITRE ATT&CK T1699, T1698), RAG retrieval abuse (LLM08), and improper output handling (LLM05). Prompt injection has no patch, so defense is logging, blast-radius design, and breaking the lethal-trifecta exfiltration path, as seen in EchoLeak (CVE-2025-32711). Keys off LLM app telemetry: prompt and completion logs, tool-call audit events, RAG retrieval logs, guardrail verdicts, the Purview unified audit log for Copilot, and Azure OpenAI diagnostics. Ships a canary-token tripwire, an egress/exfiltration detection, a tool-call fan-out rule, required logging, and a mitigation table. Use when threat-modeling an LLM, RAG, or agent feature, deciding what to log, writing detections for prompt injection or system-prompt leakage, hunting copilot data exfiltration, or triaging an EchoLeak-style incident.
umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue · ★ 0 · AI & Automation · score 62
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# OWASP LLM Top 10 - Detection and Response for Defenders Your organization is shipping LLM features whether security signed off or not: chatbots, copilots, RAG over internal documents, agents with tool access. This skill reads the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2025) as a defender's checklist and ships the detections that work today. It is defensive: it describes injection classes only to the depth needed to log, detect, and contain them, and provides no working injection payloads, jailbreak strings, or evasion techniques. ## TL;DR for defenders Treat every LLM in your stack as an untrusted component that will eventually follow someone else's instructions. There is no patch for prompt injection: the model reads system prompt, user message, retrieved document, and tool output as tokens in one context window, so instruction-following is a statistical tendency, not a security boundary. What works: least-privilege tool scopes, output handling as strict as you apply to user input, breaking the data-exfiltration leg (egress controls on what the model can render or call), a **canary token** in the system prompt as a leak tripwire, and logging prompts, completions, and tool calls as first-class audit events. The canary (rule 1 below) is the highest-precision, lowest-effort detection; the egress rule (rule 2) catches the EchoLeak-style exfiltration it misses. ## Why this belongs in your threat model now LLM-integrated apps stopped being experimental the moment they got real