← ClaudeAtlas

defend-open-redirectlisted

Defensive methodology for open redirect (CWE-601) abuse, where a link on a trusted domain sends the victim off-site via a redirect parameter, used to cloak phishing behind your brand (MITRE ATT&CK T1566.002, T1204.001) and to steal OAuth authorization codes and tokens through an attacker-controlled redirect_uri (T1528). Keys off web server, reverse-proxy, and WAF access logs (nginx, Apache, IIS), 30x responses with an off-domain Location header, IdP sign-in logs (Entra ID, Okta), and Defender for Office 365 UrlClickEvents. Gives the defender view, signal-carrying log fields, a redirect-endpoint hunt, and allowlist and token-leak hardening. Use when hardening a redirect, returnUrl, or next parameter, reviewing OAuth redirect_uri validation, hunting phishing links cloaked by your own domain, investigating an off-site Location header, or preventing code and token leakage via Referer.
umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue · ★ 0 · AI & Automation · score 62
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# Open Redirect - Defensive Methodology > **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the log sources and signals, the hunt, and the hardening, and points to public rule sources. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet. ## TL;DR An open redirect is an endpoint on your own domain that takes a destination from user input and sends the browser there without checking it. Attackers do not exploit it to break into your app; they use it so a phishing link reads as `https://trusted.example.com/login?returnUrl=https://evil.tld` and inherits your reputation, your TLS, and your email-gateway allowlisting. The same flaw in an OAuth or OIDC flow leaks authorization codes and access tokens when a loosely matched `redirect_uri` or a trailing open redirect bounces the credential to an attacker host. Fix it by never redirecting to a caller-supplied absolute URL: map an opaque key to a server-side destination, or enforce an exact-host allowlist after full canonicalization. Detect it by parsing redirect endpoints out of web and proxy logs and flagging off-domain targets. ## What it looks like, defender view In telemetry this shows up as a request to one of your redirect endpoints carrying a target parameter that