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defensive-reportinglisted

Detection and incident reporting methodology where every claim is tied to a primary source, plus detection of anti-forensic activity that attacks that evidence: log clearing and tampering (MITRE ATT&CK T1070, T1685.005, T1070.006), disabling event logging (T1685.001), and stored-data manipulation (T1565.001). Keys off Windows Security Event IDs 1102, 4719, 1100 and System 104, Sysmon Event ID 2 and process creation, and Linux auditd/journald. Gives a report structure that survives scrutiny, an evidence-hygiene and chain-of-custody checklist, source-tracing discipline, tamper-signal detection logic, a hunt for destroyed telemetry, and hardening mapped to ISO 27001 and NIST CSF 2.0. Use when writing an incident or detection report, preparing a SOC deliverable for an auditor or regulator, building an IR report template, tracing an alert claim to its log source, or hunting for cleared or tampered logs after an intrusion.
umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue · ★ 0 · Data & Documents · score 62
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# Detection and Incident Reporting - Defensive Methodology > **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the log sources and signals, and the hardening, and points to public rule sources. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet. ## TL;DR A report is only as strong as the evidence under it, and an attacker who has read your playbook attacks that evidence before you can write it. Two disciplines, one skill. First, the reporting discipline: every finding in an incident or detection report points to a specific log source, event ID, timestamp, and immutable artifact, so a reader can retrace it without taking your word for anything. Second, the detection discipline: watch for the anti-forensic moves that break that chain, above all **Windows Security Event ID 1102** (audit log cleared), **System Event ID 104** (an event log cleared), **4719** (audit policy changed), **1100** (event logging service shut down), and Sysmon **Event ID 2** (file creation time changed, the timestomp signal). A report that says "logs show X" without a retraceable pointer, and a log pipeline that cannot prove it was not tampered with, both fail the same test. ## What it looks like, defender view In telemetry, evidence tampe