detect-ad-credential-abuselisted
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# Active Directory Credential Abuse - Defensive Methodology
> **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the log sources and signals, and the hardening, and points to public rule sources. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet.
## TL;DR
Four distinct abuses share one root cause: an attacker with a foothold turns existing AD rights and protocol features into credential material. Turn on **Directory Service Access** and **Directory Service Changes** auditing on every domain controller so Events **4662** and **5136** actually fire, keep **4768** and the account-change events, and feed **Microsoft Defender for Identity** if you have it. The four highest-value signals are: a **DCSync** (replication control-access rights pulled by a principal that is not a domain controller), a **DACL write** that grants those rights or adds delegation attributes, a **TGT request with pre-authentication type 0** (AS-REP Roasting), and any **DRSUAPI replication from a non-DC source IP**. None is a silver bullet; layer them and pair with least privilege on who can replicate.
## What it looks like, defender view
- **AS-REP Roasting (T1558.004).** An account that has "Do not require Kerberos pre-authentication" set ha