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detect-ad-credential-abuselisted

Detection, hunting, and hardening methodology for Active Directory credential abuse that follows initial foothold: AS-REP Roasting (MITRE ATT&CK T1558.004), DCSync directory replication theft (T1003.006), ACL and group manipulation (T1098), and Kerberos delegation abuse (T1098 setup, T1550.003 use). Primary log sources are Windows domain controller Security events (4768, 4662, 5136, 4738, 4742, 4728/4732/4756) plus Microsoft Defender for Identity alerts and network DRSUAPI replication traffic. The skill gives the defender view of each technique, the exact events and object GUIDs to key off, a hypothesis-driven hunt, and framework-mapped hardening. Use when triaging an MDI DCSync or delegation alert, hunting for replication from a non-domain-controller, investigating accounts with Kerberos pre-authentication disabled, reviewing who holds DS-Replication rights, chasing writes to ntSecurityDescriptor or msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity, or hardening AD against post-foothold credential abuse.
umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue · ★ 0 · AI & Automation · score 62
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# Active Directory Credential Abuse - Defensive Methodology > **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the log sources and signals, and the hardening, and points to public rule sources. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet. ## TL;DR Four distinct abuses share one root cause: an attacker with a foothold turns existing AD rights and protocol features into credential material. Turn on **Directory Service Access** and **Directory Service Changes** auditing on every domain controller so Events **4662** and **5136** actually fire, keep **4768** and the account-change events, and feed **Microsoft Defender for Identity** if you have it. The four highest-value signals are: a **DCSync** (replication control-access rights pulled by a principal that is not a domain controller), a **DACL write** that grants those rights or adds delegation attributes, a **TGT request with pre-authentication type 0** (AS-REP Roasting), and any **DRSUAPI replication from a non-DC source IP**. None is a silver bullet; layer them and pair with least privilege on who can replicate. ## What it looks like, defender view - **AS-REP Roasting (T1558.004).** An account that has "Do not require Kerberos pre-authentication" set ha