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detect-anti-forensicslisted

Detection and hunt methodology for anti-forensic indicator removal on Windows endpoints: audit-log clearing (MITRE ATT&CK T1685.005), timestomping (T1070.006), and file wiping or artifact deletion (T1070.004), the last two under the T1070 Indicator Removal parent, with the adjacent Defense Impairment signal T1685.001 Disable or Modify Windows Event Log. It keys off Windows Security event 1102, System event 104, Security 1100 and 4719, Sysmon event 2 (file creation time changed) and events 23 and 26 (file delete), plus process-creation and PowerShell logging. The skill gives defenders the real event IDs and fields, a forensic-grade MFT and USN hunt for timestomping, hardening that moves evidence off the host, and links to public SigmaHQ and MITRE rule sources. Use when triaging an Event ID 1102 alert, investigating a cleared Security log, hunting for timestomped files, chasing suspected log tampering or wevtutil cl / Clear-EventLog activity, or hardening log retention so a local wipe does not destroy evidence.
umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue · ★ 0 · AI & Automation · score 62
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# Anti-Forensics (Indicator Removal) - Defensive Methodology > **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the log sources and signals, and the hardening, and points to public rule sources. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet. ## TL;DR for defenders An intruder who already has administrative rights will try to erase their trail: clear the Windows event logs, backdate file timestamps so tooling blends into the OS install, and wipe the files they dropped. Clearing the **Security** log writes **Event ID 1102** and clearing any other channel writes **System Event ID 104**, so both are high-signal and rare in healthy operation. Timestomping shows up in **Sysmon Event ID 2** and, more reliably, in the NTFS Master File Table when `$STANDARD_INFORMATION` and `$FILE_NAME` timestamps disagree. The single most valuable control is not a rule at all: forward logs off the host in near real time, so a local clear leaves the evidence intact on the collector. These are late-stage detections. By the time they fire the attacker usually owns the box, so treat any hit as an active-intrusion lead, not noise. ## What it looks like, defender view A Security log that ends abruptly, then resumes, with a lone 1102 a