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detect-c2-beaconinglisted

Detection and hunt methodology for command-and-control beaconing, where an implant calls home on a regular interval over HTTP(S), DNS, or a tunnel service, hidden inside normal egress (MITRE ATT&CK T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1071.004 DNS, T1573 Encrypted Channel, T1571 Non-Standard Port, T1572 Protocol Tunneling, T1090 Proxy; tactic TA0011 Command and Control). Works from Zeek conn.log/ssl.log/dns.log, Suricata EVE JSON, firewall and web-proxy logs, NetFlow/IPFIX, and endpoint Sysmon Event ID 3/22. It gives the defender's view of beacon periodicity and jitter, JA3/JA3S and JA4 TLS fingerprinting, and tunnel-service detection, plus hunt steps and hardening. Use when hunting for regular callbacks, triaging a long-lived outbound connection, analyzing JA3/JA4 hashes, investigating suspected Cobalt Strike, Sliver, or Mythic C2, chasing DNS or HTTPS tunneling, or baselining egress for periodic traffic.
umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue · ★ 0 · AI & Automation · score 62
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# Command-and-Control Beaconing - Defensive Methodology > **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the log sources and signals, and the hardening, and points to public rule sources. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet. ## TL;DR Beaconing is an implant phoning home on a schedule. The three signals that survive encryption are **timing** (connections repeat on a near-fixed interval even when the operator adds jitter), **TLS fingerprint** (the client hello is often identical across every call-out, giving a stable JA3/JA4 hash that may match a known tooling fingerprint), and **destination shape** (a single internal host holding a long-lived or endlessly repeating session to one external endpoint, often a tunnel provider or a freshly registered domain). You do not need to decrypt payloads. Score internal-to-external pairs on connection-interval regularity and consistent data size, fingerprint the TLS handshake, and flag egress to tunnel services and high-entropy DNS. None of these is decisive alone; stack them. ## What it looks like, defender view In flow and proxy telemetry a beacon shows up as the same source reaching the same destination over and over, at intervals that cluster tightly aro