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detect-cloud-attack-pathslisted

Detection and hunt methodology for cloud IAM attack paths across AWS, Azure, and GCP: privilege-escalation chains, credential and role manipulation, and control-plane log tampering that turn a foothold into tenant-wide control (MITRE ATT&CK T1078.004, T1098/.001/.003, T1136.003, T1548.005, T1685.002, T1580). Keys off AWS CloudTrail management events, Microsoft Entra ID audit and sign-in logs plus Azure Activity Log, and GCP Cloud Audit Logs, naming the exact event and identity fields to pivot on, then points to public rule sources and gives hardening mapped to the UMBRASEC guide. Use when triaging a suspicious IAM change, hunting cloud privilege escalation, investigating new access keys or role grants, chasing CloudTrail being disabled, writing or reviewing cloud control-plane detections, or asking how to detect cloud attack paths.
umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue · ★ 0 · DevOps & Infrastructure · score 62
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# Cloud IAM Attack Paths - Defensive Methodology > **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the log sources and signals, and the hardening, and points to public rule sources. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet. ## What it looks like, defender view **TL;DR.** A cloud attack path is a short chain of control-plane actions that converts a low-value foothold into durable high privilege: the actor adds a credential or role they should not have, assumes it, and often blinds the logs on the way out. You rarely see a single smoking gun; you see a sequence by one principal in minutes. Watch the identity services (`iam`, `sts` in AWS, RoleManagement in Entra, `iam.googleapis.com` in GCP) and the logging-config services, and correlate by the acting principal rather than alerting on any one event. In telemetry this presents as an identity doing something it has never done before: an IAM user minting a second access key, a service principal getting a new client secret, a service account key being created, a role assignment to Owner or a policy attaching `AdministratorAccess`, followed by use of that new power from a new source IP, ASN, or user agent. Control-plane recon (bulk list and describe calls)