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detect-container-escapelisted

Detection, hunting, and hardening for container escape to the host (MITRE ATT&CK T1611 Escape to Host, Privilege Escalation; related T1610 Deploy Container and T1613 Container and Resource Discovery). Keys off Linux auditd syscall records, CNCF Falco and eBPF runtime sensors, and the Kubernetes kube-apiserver audit log to catch namespace breakout, privileged or sensitive-mount workloads, capability abuse, and host-namespace process execution. Gives the defender view, the exact log sources and fields, a prose detection approach pointing to public rule sources, a hypothesis-driven hunt, seccomp and capability hardening, and the honest blind spots. Use when detecting or hunting container escape, investigating a shell spawned in a container, triaging a privileged pod or hostPath mount alert, monitoring seccomp and Linux capabilities on container hosts, or hardening Docker and Kubernetes against breakout to the node.
umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue · ★ 0 · DevOps & Infrastructure · score 62
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# Container Escape to Host - Defensive Methodology > **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the log sources and signals, and the hardening, and points to public rule sources. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet. ## TL;DR for defenders Container escape is a process inside a container gaining code execution on the host node (MITRE ATT&CK **T1611 Escape to Host**). It almost always leaves one of a small set of host-visible traces: a workload started with `--privileged` or `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, a host path or the container socket mounted into the container, a process changing its namespace back to the host (`setns`/`unshare`), a mount of the host filesystem from inside a container, or a write to a sensitive kernel interface such as a cgroup `release_agent` or `core_pattern`. You detect it at two layers at once: the Linux kernel (auditd syscalls plus a runtime sensor like **Falco** or an eBPF tool) on every node, and the **Kubernetes kube-apiserver audit log** for the dangerous pod spec that enables the escape in the first place. This skill ships no UMBRASEC rule for this threat; it points to maintained public rule sets instead. ## What it looks like, defender view In telemetry an escape shows