detect-container-escapelisted
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# Container Escape to Host - Defensive Methodology
> **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the log sources and signals, and the hardening, and points to public rule sources. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet.
## TL;DR for defenders
Container escape is a process inside a container gaining code execution on the host node (MITRE ATT&CK **T1611 Escape to Host**). It almost always leaves one of a small set of host-visible traces: a workload started with `--privileged` or `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, a host path or the container socket mounted into the container, a process changing its namespace back to the host (`setns`/`unshare`), a mount of the host filesystem from inside a container, or a write to a sensitive kernel interface such as a cgroup `release_agent` or `core_pattern`. You detect it at two layers at once: the Linux kernel (auditd syscalls plus a runtime sensor like **Falco** or an eBPF tool) on every node, and the **Kubernetes kube-apiserver audit log** for the dangerous pod spec that enables the escape in the first place. This skill ships no UMBRASEC rule for this threat; it points to maintained public rule sets instead.
## What it looks like, defender view
In telemetry an escape shows