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detect-edr-evasionlisted

Detection and hunting methodology for endpoint sensor tampering: AMSI patching (amsi.dll AmsiScanBuffer), ETW blinding (ntdll EtwEventWrite and provider disable), and userland API unhooking that restores a clean ntdll to defeat hooks (MITRE ATT&CK T1685 Disable or Modify Tools, including indicator blocking, with related T1620 Reflective Code Loading and T1055 Process Injection). Keys off Windows endpoint telemetry: Sysmon Image/DLL load (EID 7), ProcessTampering (EID 25), CreateRemoteThread (EID 8), PowerShell Script Block Logging (EID 4104), Defender Operational events, and the suspicious absence of expected ETW providers. Gives a defender view of the signals, a hunt for unhooking and telemetry gaps, and tamper-resistant logging and application-control hardening. Use when triaging a suspected AMSI or ETW bypass, hunting for DLL unhooking or ntdll tampering, investigating why endpoint telemetry went quiet on a host, reviewing EDR tamper-protection alerts, or hardening a fleet against defense impairment.
umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue · ★ 0 · DevOps & Infrastructure · score 62
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# AMSI, ETW Tampering and API Unhooking - Defensive Methodology > **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the log sources and signals, the hunt, and the hardening, and points to public rule sources by URL. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet. ## TL;DR for defenders Modern offensive tradecraft tries to blind the sensor before it acts. The three moves you will see most are: patching **AMSI** in process memory so script and .NET content is never scanned, patching or disabling **ETW** so the telemetry an EDR subscribes to never reaches it, and **unhooking** by overwriting the in-memory `ntdll.dll` (and sometimes `kernel32.dll`) with a clean copy read from disk or `\KnownDlls`, which strips out the userland hooks an EDR planted. All three leave a footprint, but where depends on whether the write is in-process or cross-process. A process patching its own `AmsiScanBuffer` or `EtwEventWrite` opens no handle and does not trip Sysmon; that case surfaces through EDR memory-integrity checks, the `Microsoft-Windows-Threat-Intelligence` ETW provider, and Defender's AMSI tamper detection. Sysmon sees the cross-process variant (EID 10 write-capable access plus an unbacked call trace), the image-replacem