detect-initial-accesslisted
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# Initial Access via Public-Facing Exploitation - Defensive Methodology
> **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the log sources and signals, the hunt, and the hardening, and points to public rule sources. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet. For the two specific cases this generalises, the shipped Tier 1 skills are [detect-metabase-sqli](../../web/detect-metabase-sqli/SKILL.md) and [detect-ncentral-post-exploitation](../../post-exploitation/detect-ncentral-post-exploitation/SKILL.md).
## TL;DR for defenders
Initial access through an internet-facing application is a two-part event, and you detect it in two places. First, an anomalous request reaches an exposed endpoint that should rarely or never take hostile input: Metabase's unauthenticated `/api/session/reset_password`, or the alternate authentication path abused in N-central (CWE-288). Second, the exploited host does something it has never done before: spawns an unexpected process, writes a binary into a user directory, or opens an outbound tunnel. Catch the first with edge logs (reverse proxy, WAF, netflow); catch the second with host process and service telemetry. Neither signal alone is decisive, so instrument both and correlate