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detect-kerberoastinglisted

Detection and response methodology for Kerberoasting in Active Directory (MITRE ATT&CK T1558.003, Credential Access). Covers the RC4 service-ticket downgrade signal, SPN request fan-out, and the honeypot-SPN tripwire - three layered Sigma detections keyed off Windows Security Event ID 4769 on domain controllers, each with tuning, false-positive notes, and gMSA/AES mitigations. Use when investigating suspicious Kerberos service-ticket activity, writing or reviewing Kerberoasting detections, hunting for SPN enumeration, triaging 4769 alerts, or hardening service accounts against offline password cracking.
umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue · ★ 0 · AI & Automation · score 62
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# Kerberoasting - Detection and Response Kerberoasting lets any authenticated domain user request a service ticket for an account that has a Service Principal Name, then crack the service account's password offline. It needs no special privileges, produces no failed logons, and trips no lockout. That is why it is still one of the most common post-compromise techniques. This skill is defensive: it explains the technique only as far as detection and mitigation require, and ships no roasting or cracking tooling. ## TL;DR for defenders Enable **Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations** on every domain controller, then watch **Event ID 4769** for two things: service-ticket requests using **RC4** (`TicketEncryptionType 0x17`) in a domain that should be AES, and a single account requesting tickets for an unusual number of distinct SPNs. A decoy **honeypot SPN** turns anomaly-hunting into a near-zero-false-positive alarm and is the highest-value, lowest-effort detection here. Layer all three rules below; none is a silver bullet alone. ## Why it still matters in 2026 The attack abuses how Kerberos is meant to work, so there is no patch that removes it. Microsoft is retiring RC4 in phases across supported domain controllers: the January 2026 updates added KDC audit events 201-209 flagging RC4 use, and the April 2026 updates switched the DC default to AES-only for accounts with no explicit `msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes`. But any account whose `msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes` still