detect-l2-l3-attackslisted
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# Layer 2 / Layer 3 On-Path Attacks - Defensive Methodology
> **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the log sources and signals, and the hardening, and points to public rule and sensor sources. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet.
## TL;DR
Switched Ethernet and the Windows name-resolution stack both trust unauthenticated broadcast and multicast by design, so an attacker on the same broadcast domain can insert themselves on-path four ways: forge ARP replies to claim the gateway's IP (T1557.002), answer LLMNR (`udp/5355`) and NBT-NS (`udp/137`) name lookups that real DNS failed (T1557.001), stand up a rogue DHCP server that hands out itself as gateway and DNS (T1557.003), and then forge DNS answers for the traffic now flowing through them. The goal is usually to capture or relay NTLM authentication. You detect this from three places at once: switch control-plane syslog (Dynamic ARP Inspection and DHCP Snooping), network metadata (Zeek `dns.log` / `dhcp.log`, arpwatch, Wireshark), and the Windows auth trail (Sysmon network connections plus NTLM relay logons). The highest-confidence single detection is a canary-name tripwire: query a hostname that does not exist and nothing should ever res