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detect-lateral-movementlisted

Detection and hunt methodology for Windows lateral movement: remote execution over SMB/WMI/WinRM/RDP/DCOM (MITRE ATT&CK T1021, T1047, T1569.002), Pass-the-Hash and overpass-the-hash (T1550.002), lateral tool transfer (T1570), and internal tunneling or proxying (T1572, T1090.001). Names the Windows Security events (4624, 4648, 4672, 5140/5145, 7045/4697), Sysmon events, and WMI/WinRM/RDP operational logs that carry the signal, gives a hypothesis-driven hunt, and maps hardening to the Essential Eight, ISO 27001, and NIST CSF 2.0. Use when triaging an intrusion spreading host to host, hunting for PsExec/wmiexec/WinRM/DCOM remote exec, investigating NTLM network logons that look like Pass-the-Hash, chasing an internal tunnel or port-proxy, triaging 4624/4648/7045 alerts, or hardening admin paths against credential reuse.
umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue · ★ 0 · AI & Automation · score 62
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# Lateral Movement - Defensive Methodology > **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the log sources and signals, the hunt, and the hardening, and points to public rule sources. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet. ## TL;DR Lateral movement is one identity reused from one host to reach another. After an initial foothold an operator authenticates outward, runs code on the next box, and sometimes tunnels the hop so it skips your network sensors. You catch it at three choke points: the **authentication** (Security Event 4624 network logons and 4648 explicit-credential logons, especially NTLM logon type 3 from a workstation to a server, the classic Pass-the-Hash shape), the **remote execution** it enables (service installs in Event 7045, named pipes like `\\.\pipe\PSEXESVC` in Sysmon 17/18, `wmiprvse.exe` and `wsmprovhost.exe` spawning children), and the **channel** (Sysmon Event 3 and firewall logs showing long-lived connections, non-standard ports, `netsh portproxy`, or tunnel clients). None of these is alone conclusive; the signal is one account touching many hosts admin-to-admin in a short window. Use public, maintained rules (SigmaHQ, Defender for Identity) rather than a hand-rolled one