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detect-linux-privesclisted

Detection and hardening methodology for Linux local privilege escalation through setuid/setgid binaries, file capabilities, and sudo abuse (MITRE ATT&CK T1548, T1548.001, T1548.003, plus T1068 for vulnerable SUID/sudo/polkit binaries such as PwnKit and Baron Samedit). Keys off auditd EXECVE/SYSCALL records, sudo logs in /var/log/auth.log, /var/log/secure, and journald, Sysmon for Linux Event ID 1, and osquery/EDR telemetry. Gives the defender view of a privesc chain, the records to watch, a hypothesis-driven hunt, links to public rule sources, and a framework-mapped hardening plan. Use when investigating a suspected local root escalation, triaging a sudo or pkexec alert, auditing SUID binaries and file capabilities, hunting for GTFOBins-style abuse, writing Linux privesc detections, or hardening sudoers and setuid surface.
umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue · ★ 0 · AI & Automation · score 62
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# Linux Privilege Escalation (SUID, Capabilities, Sudo) - Defensive Methodology > **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the log sources and signals, the hunt, and the hardening, and points to public rule sources. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet. ## TL;DR for defenders A local attacker who already has a low-privileged shell looks for three cheap paths to root: a setuid-root binary they can coerce into running their code, a binary that carries a dangerous Linux file capability (for example `cap_setuid+ep`), or a sudo rule (or a sudo/polkit vulnerability) that lets them run something as root. In telemetry the tell is almost always the same shape: a process whose audit login id (`auid`) stays as the unprivileged user while its effective uid (`euid`) becomes `0`, often with an unexpected child shell. Turn on auditd with execve and setuid rules plus `/etc/sudoers*` watches, forward sudo authpriv logs, and alert on root-gaining execs that do not come from your known admin accounts and known binaries. Patch the perennial local-root bugs (PwnKit, Baron Samedit) fast, shrink the SUID and capability surface, and lock sudoers down to explicit commands. ## What it looks like, defender view In