detect-oauth-consent-phishinglisted
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# OAuth Consent Phishing - Detection and Response
OAuth consent phishing never asks for a password and sails straight through MFA, because the victim is not tricked into logging in - they are tricked into clicking Accept. The attacker registers an OAuth application, phishes a user into consenting to delegated Microsoft Graph permissions, and walks away with an access token plus, if offline_access was requested, a long-lived refresh token. Because the app authenticates as itself and the consent already happened, the attacker's later Graph calls trigger no interactive sign-in and no MFA prompt. Revoking the user's password does nothing; you have to revoke the grant. This skill is defensive: it explains the technique only as far as detection and mitigation require, and ships no app-registration templates, phishing kits, or token-abuse tooling.
## TL;DR for defenders
Make sure Entra ID logs are actually exported to a Log Analytics workspace or Microsoft Sentinel, not just living in the portal's 30-day view. Then watch the Entra **AuditLogs** table for a `Consent to application` event granting sensitive scopes (mail, files, directory, or `offline_access`), and watch **MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs** for the **POST** to a URI containing `oauth2PermissionGrants` - that POST is the act of granting delegated permission and is the single highest-fidelity moment. A tenant-wide `IsAdminConsent == "True"` grant, or an app-role (application permission) assignment like `full_access_as_app`,