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detect-phishinglisted

Detection, hunting, and hardening methodology for phishing as initial and credential access: credential-harvest and attacker-in-the-middle (AiTM) link lures, malicious attachments, spearphishing via service, and OAuth consent phishing (MITRE ATT&CK T1566, T1566.001, T1566.002, T1566.003, T1598, T1528). Signals live in Defender for Office 365 advanced-hunting tables, the Exchange Online Unified Audit Log, Entra ID SigninLogs and AuditLogs, and web-proxy and DNS logs. Gives the defender view, a hunt, framework-mapped hardening, and pointers to public and sibling consent-phishing rules. Use when triaging a reported phishing email, investigating suspected AiTM session-token theft or a post-delivery inbox rule, hunting for credential-harvest URL clicks or newly registered lookalike domains, writing or reviewing email-phishing detections, or hardening a tenant against spearphishing and illicit consent grants.
umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue · ★ 0 · AI & Automation · score 62
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# Phishing - Defensive Methodology > **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the log sources and signals, the hunt, and the hardening, and points to public rule sources. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet. The one exception is the consent-phishing variant, which already has a Tier 1 sibling: [detect-oauth-consent-phishing](../../auth/detect-oauth-consent-phishing/SKILL.md) ships tuned KQL for that path, and this skill defers to it instead of duplicating it. ## TL;DR for defenders Phishing is a delivery technique, not a single artifact, so detection works best as a chain across three moments: the message arriving, the user acting on it, and the account being abused afterward. In a Microsoft 365 estate, confirm Defender for Office 365 advanced-hunting is retained and then watch **EmailEvents** and **EmailUrlInfo** for lures that passed filtering, **UrlClickEvents** for the click that turned a delivered mail into an active one, and **SigninLogs** plus the Unified Audit Log for the aftermath: a sign-in from new infrastructure followed by a **New-InboxRule** forwarding or deleting mail is the classic attacker-in-the-middle and business-email-compromise tell. Treat SPF, DKIM, and DMARC result