detect-supply-chain-compromiselisted
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# Supply-Chain Compromise - Detection and Response
Supply-chain compromise reaches you through something you already trust: a package you pulled from a registry, a container image you deployed, or the managed service provider that runs your fleet. The breach itself usually happens somewhere you cannot patch - an upstream maintainer account, a vendor build pipeline, an RMM console in your provider's rack - so the defensive win is not stopping the compromise upstream but catching what it drops on the hosts you do own. This skill is defensive: it explains the technique only as far as detection and mitigation require, and ships no package-poisoning, implant, or tunnelling tooling.
## TL;DR for defenders
You often cannot patch the thing that was breached, so detect its leave-behinds on your own hosts. For a **poisoned package or tampered artifact**, watch file creation under Python **site-packages / dist-packages** for an unexpected **`.pth` import hook plus a credential-stealer payload** - the compromised LiteLLM 1.107.0 release dropped `cook.pth` and `cook.py` so that every Python start reran a stealer. For a **compromised MSP or RMM**, hunt the operator's leave-behinds: a Windows service named **Cloudflared** nobody requested (**System log Event ID 7045**), and a binary **masquerading as `svchost.exe` outside System32** (process creation). The highest-value control here is **inventory**: you cannot detect a backdoored dependency, image, or supplier channel you did not know y