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detect-supply-chain-compromiselisted

Detection and response for supply-chain compromise: a poisoned software package or tampered build artifact that executes on install (MITRE ATT&CK T1195.002, T1546 for .pth / import-hook persistence, T1552 for credential stealers), and a trusted MSP or RMM platform turned into a delivery channel (T1199, T1543.003, T1572). Keyed off Linux file-creation telemetry (auditd, Sysmon for Linux, EDR) over site-packages, Windows System Event ID 7045, Windows process creation (Sysmon 1 / Security 4688), and package and container inventory. Ships two UMBRASEC sigma-pack rules plus a hunt, with tuning and Essential Eight / ISO 27001 / NIST CSF 2.0 mappings. Use when a dependency or Docker image you run was backdoored, triaging a PyPI, npm, or container supply-chain advisory, hunting a cook.pth import hook or dropped credential stealer, responding to an MSP or RMM compromise, or chasing an unexpected Cloudflared tunnel service.
umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue · ★ 0 · AI & Automation · score 62
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# Supply-Chain Compromise - Detection and Response Supply-chain compromise reaches you through something you already trust: a package you pulled from a registry, a container image you deployed, or the managed service provider that runs your fleet. The breach itself usually happens somewhere you cannot patch - an upstream maintainer account, a vendor build pipeline, an RMM console in your provider's rack - so the defensive win is not stopping the compromise upstream but catching what it drops on the hosts you do own. This skill is defensive: it explains the technique only as far as detection and mitigation require, and ships no package-poisoning, implant, or tunnelling tooling. ## TL;DR for defenders You often cannot patch the thing that was breached, so detect its leave-behinds on your own hosts. For a **poisoned package or tampered artifact**, watch file creation under Python **site-packages / dist-packages** for an unexpected **`.pth` import hook plus a credential-stealer payload** - the compromised LiteLLM 1.107.0 release dropped `cook.pth` and `cook.py` so that every Python start reran a stealer. For a **compromised MSP or RMM**, hunt the operator's leave-behinds: a Windows service named **Cloudflared** nobody requested (**System log Event ID 7045**), and a binary **masquerading as `svchost.exe` outside System32** (process creation). The highest-value control here is **inventory**: you cannot detect a backdoored dependency, image, or supplier channel you did not know y