detect-windows-privesclisted
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# Windows Privilege Escalation (Token, Service, UAC Bypass) - Defensive Methodology
> **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the log sources and signals, the hunt, and the hardening, and points to public rule sources. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet.
## TL;DR for defenders
An attacker who already has a low-privileged foothold on Windows looks for three cheap paths to local administrator or SYSTEM: steal or impersonate a more privileged process token (the classic "Potato" family abusing `SeImpersonatePrivilege` on service accounts), abuse a service whose binary, folder, registry key, or unquoted path they can write (so their payload runs as the service account, usually SYSTEM), or run an auto-elevating Windows binary to bypass UAC and jump from medium to high integrity without a consent prompt. In telemetry the common tell is an integrity-level or token jump that did not come through a legitimate elevation: a process running at High or System integrity whose parent is a medium-integrity user process or an auto-elevating LOLBin, a new or modified service pointing at an attacker-writable path, or a special-privilege logon that your baseline does not expect. Turn on process creation aud