← ClaudeAtlas

detect-windows-privesclisted

Detection and hardening methodology for Windows local privilege escalation via access-token manipulation, weak or hijackable services, and UAC bypass (MITRE ATT&CK T1134, T1134.001, T1134.002, T1134.003, T1543.003, T1574.009, T1574.010, T1574.011, T1548.002, T1068). Keys off the Windows Security log (Event IDs 4688, 4672, 4673, 4697, 4703, 4624, 4648), System log Service Control Manager events 7045 and 7040, and Sysmon (1, 6, 7, 10, 12, 13, 17, 18). Gives the defender view of a privesc chain, the events to watch, a hypothesis-driven hunt, links to public rule sources, and a framework-mapped hardening plan. Use when investigating a suspected local admin or SYSTEM escalation, triaging a fodhelper or eventvwr UAC-bypass or Potato token-impersonation alert, auditing service permissions and unquoted paths, hunting integrity-level jumps, writing Windows privesc detections, or hardening UAC, services, and local admin rights.
umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue · ★ 0 · AI & Automation · score 62
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# Windows Privilege Escalation (Token, Service, UAC Bypass) - Defensive Methodology > **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the log sources and signals, the hunt, and the hardening, and points to public rule sources. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet. ## TL;DR for defenders An attacker who already has a low-privileged foothold on Windows looks for three cheap paths to local administrator or SYSTEM: steal or impersonate a more privileged process token (the classic "Potato" family abusing `SeImpersonatePrivilege` on service accounts), abuse a service whose binary, folder, registry key, or unquoted path they can write (so their payload runs as the service account, usually SYSTEM), or run an auto-elevating Windows binary to bypass UAC and jump from medium to high integrity without a consent prompt. In telemetry the common tell is an integrity-level or token jump that did not come through a legitimate elevation: a process running at High or System integrity whose parent is a medium-integrity user process or an auto-elevating LOLBin, a new or modified service pointing at an attacker-writable path, or a special-privilege logon that your baseline does not expect. Turn on process creation aud