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harden-api-securitylisted

Defensive methodology for API-layer abuse across REST, gRPC, and WebSocket: broken object- and function-level authorization (BOLA/BFLA), broken authentication and token replay, mass assignment, SSRF from URL-accepting parameters, and unrestricted resource consumption (MITRE ATT&CK T1190, T1078, T1528, T1552.005, T1499.003). Keys off API gateway and reverse-proxy access logs (AWS API Gateway, Azure APIM, Kong, Envoy/Istio), WAF logs (AWS WAF, Azure Front Door/App Gateway), and application authorization-decision logs. Gives the defender view, log sources, a detection approach pointing to public rule sources, a hypothesis-driven hunt, and gateway plus authorization hardening. Use when hardening a REST/gRPC/WebSocket API, writing API-abuse detections, hunting for BOLA/IDOR enumeration or BFLA, triaging bursts of 401/403/429 on an API gateway, or designing edge authorization and schema-validation controls.
umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue · ★ 0 · API & Backend · score 62
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# API Abuse (REST, gRPC, WebSocket) - Defensive Methodology > **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the log sources and signals, the hunt, and the hardening, and points to public rule sources. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet. ## TL;DR The most damaging API attacks are authorization failures, not memory-corruption exploits: an authenticated, in-scope caller asks for an object or a function that is not theirs, and the backend hands it over. HTTP status alone will not catch this, because a successful BOLA returns `200`, not `403`. The highest-value defensive move is to log the authorization decision as a structured event (who asked, which object, who owns it, allow or deny) so that "User A read User B's record" becomes one legible line instead of an invisible `200`. Layer that with per-principal access-breadth monitoring on the gateway, schema validation that rejects unexpected fields at the edge (closing mass assignment), and allowlist-based egress for any URL-accepting parameter (closing SSRF to cloud metadata). Enforce the same authorization at the gRPC interceptor and the WebSocket upgrade, not only on REST. ## What it looks like, defender view In gateway and proxy logs the camp