← ClaudeAtlas

harden-cicd-pipelinelisted

Defensive methodology for CI/CD pipeline compromise: expression and workflow injection that turns attacker-controlled PR titles, branch names, and issue bodies into runner command execution, over-broad OIDC federation that hands the wrong repo or branch cloud credentials, and self-hosted runner abuse (MITRE ATT&CK T1195.002, T1059, T1199, T1078.004, T1552.004, T1098.001). Signals live in the GitHub/GitLab/Azure DevOps audit log, runner process and EDR telemetry, and cloud federation logs (AWS CloudTrail AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity, Entra ID service-principal sign-ins, GCP STS). Gives the defender view, what to log and alert on, a hunt, and OIDC, runner-isolation, and workflow-injection hardening. Use when hardening GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or Azure Pipelines, reviewing an OIDC trust policy, hunting for poisoned pipeline execution, triaging an unexpected AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity, or isolating self-hosted runners.
umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue · ★ 0 · DevOps & Infrastructure · score 62
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# CI/CD Pipeline Compromise - Defensive Methodology > **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the log sources and signals, and the hardening, and points to public rule sources. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet. ## TL;DR A CI/CD pipeline runs code in a trusted context, holds deployment credentials, and is watched less closely than production. Three paths do most of the damage, and each has a specific defender signal. **Workflow injection:** attacker-controlled text (`${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}`, `github.head_ref`, issue and comment bodies) flows into a `run:` step and executes as the runner; the tell is a `Runner.Worker` child process spawning a shell with network egress on a `pull_request_target` or `workflow_run` job. **OIDC over-trust:** the pipeline exchanges a short-lived OIDC token for cloud credentials, but the cloud trust policy accepts a wildcard subject, so the wrong repo, fork, or branch can assume the role; the tell is an `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` in CloudTrail whose `subjectFromWebIdentityToken` does not match your expected `repo:ORG/REPO:ref:` prefix. **Self-hosted runner abuse:** a new or persistent runner on a public or widely forked repo lets a forked-PR