harden-cicd-pipelinelisted
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# CI/CD Pipeline Compromise - Defensive Methodology
> **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the log sources and signals, and the hardening, and points to public rule sources. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet.
## TL;DR
A CI/CD pipeline runs code in a trusted context, holds deployment credentials, and is watched less closely than production. Three paths do most of the damage, and each has a specific defender signal. **Workflow injection:** attacker-controlled text (`${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}`, `github.head_ref`, issue and comment bodies) flows into a `run:` step and executes as the runner; the tell is a `Runner.Worker` child process spawning a shell with network egress on a `pull_request_target` or `workflow_run` job. **OIDC over-trust:** the pipeline exchanges a short-lived OIDC token for cloud credentials, but the cloud trust policy accepts a wildcard subject, so the wrong repo, fork, or branch can assume the role; the tell is an `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` in CloudTrail whose `subjectFromWebIdentityToken` does not match your expected `repo:ORG/REPO:ref:` prefix. **Self-hosted runner abuse:** a new or persistent runner on a public or widely forked repo lets a forked-PR