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harden-crypto-implementationslisted

Defensive methodology against exploitation of broken application cryptography: CBC padding oracles, AES-GCM and stream-cipher nonce/IV reuse, and weak-primitive misuse (ECB, DES/3DES, RC4, MD5/SHA-1, RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, static IVs) that let an attacker decrypt, forge, or tamper with protected data (MITRE ATT&CK T1557, T1600, T1040). Signals live in web and application error logs, crypto-library exceptions, WAF and reverse-proxy logs, and Zeek ssl.log; much exposure shows only in code and TLS config. Gives the defender view of each flaw class, the errors to log and alert on, a hunt across logs and source, and primitive-level hardening mapped to public standards and, where they ground, UMBRASEC guide controls. Use when hardening or reviewing an encryption implementation, triaging a burst of padding or decryption errors, hunting a padding-oracle probe, investigating weak cipher negotiation, or fixing nonce reuse or retiring a weak cipher.
umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue · ★ 0 · AI & Automation · score 62
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# Broken Cryptography Implementations - Defensive Methodology > **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the log sources and signals, and the hardening, and points to public rule sources. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet. ## TL;DR Three flaw classes carry nearly all practical cryptographic breaks: unauthenticated CBC that leaks a **padding oracle**, **nonce or IV reuse** (catastrophic for AES-GCM and for any stream cipher), and **weak primitives** (ECB, DES/3DES, RC4, MD5/SHA-1 used for signing, RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, static IVs). Padding-oracle exploitation is the one with a strong runtime signal: it sends thousands of mutated ciphertexts to one endpoint and reads the decrypt outcome from the response, so you see a burst of decryption or padding errors and alternating success/error from a single source against a single parameter. Nonce reuse and weak-primitive misuse are mostly code and TLS-configuration problems with little runtime signal, so the defense is inventory and review, not alerting. Harden by moving to authenticated encryption (AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305) with unique nonces and strict key rotation, returning uniform constant-time errors so no oracle leaks, retiring weak ciphers