harden-crypto-implementationslisted
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# Broken Cryptography Implementations - Defensive Methodology
> **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the log sources and signals, and the hardening, and points to public rule sources. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet.
## TL;DR
Three flaw classes carry nearly all practical cryptographic breaks: unauthenticated CBC that leaks a **padding oracle**, **nonce or IV reuse** (catastrophic for AES-GCM and for any stream cipher), and **weak primitives** (ECB, DES/3DES, RC4, MD5/SHA-1 used for signing, RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, static IVs). Padding-oracle exploitation is the one with a strong runtime signal: it sends thousands of mutated ciphertexts to one endpoint and reads the decrypt outcome from the response, so you see a burst of decryption or padding errors and alternating success/error from a single source against a single parameter. Nonce reuse and weak-primitive misuse are mostly code and TLS-configuration problems with little runtime signal, so the defense is inventory and review, not alerting. Harden by moving to authenticated encryption (AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305) with unique nonces and strict key rotation, returning uniform constant-time errors so no oracle leaks, retiring weak ciphers