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harden-iotlisted

Harden IoT and embedded devices against firmware tampering, hardware-interface abuse, and RTOS/ICS compromise: firmware replacement, root shells on open UART or JTAG/SWD ports, unlocked bootloader consoles, default credentials, and unauthorized commands or program downloads over Modbus, DNP3, S7comm, and MQTT (MITRE ATT&CK T1542, T1542.001, T1495, T1200, T1078.001; ICS T1693.001, T1693.002, T1694.001, T0843, T1692.001, T0848). Signals: firmware and boot telemetry (verified boot, OTA signature checks, TPM attestation), device console syslog, OT network monitoring (Zeek, Mosquitto), and Microsoft Defender for IoT alerts. Gives a hunt and a hardening plan mapped to ISO 27001, NIST CSF, and the Essential Eight. Use when hardening an IoT or embedded fleet, locking down debug ports and bootloader consoles, enforcing signed firmware and secure boot, hunting unauthorized PLC program downloads or rogue Modbus writes, or triaging Defender for IoT alerts.
umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue · ★ 0 · AI & Automation · score 62
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# IoT, Embedded, and ICS Hardening - Defensive Methodology > **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the log sources and signals, the hunt, and the hardening, and points to public rule sources. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet. ## TL;DR IoT and embedded security fails at three seams: the firmware image, the physical debug interface, and the control protocols an RTOS or PLC speaks. An attacker who cannot break AES still gets far by replacing or downgrading firmware, dropping a root shell on an open serial or JTAG header, stopping at an unlocked bootloader console, logging in with a default credential, or sending control commands as a rogue master. You rarely watch the attacker at the pins; you watch the device report an unexpected firmware version, a boot measurement that does not match, a root login on a console that should have none, and a write or program-download command from a host that is not the engineering workstation. The durable defenses are prevention: sign firmware and enforce verified boot with anti-rollback, fuse off or readout-protect the debug ports, strip the bootloader console and the root getty from production builds, replace default credentials with unique per-devic