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harden-k8slisted

Defensive methodology for Kubernetes cluster attacks: over-privileged RBAC and stolen service-account tokens driving the API server, interactive access to running workloads, and attacker-deployed or privileged pods used to escape to the node and persist (MITRE ATT&CK T1078, T1552.007, T1609, T1610, T1525, T1611, T1613, T1053.007). Signals live in the Kubernetes API server audit log and its managed equivalents (EKS control-plane logs, GKE Cloud Audit Logs, AKSAudit tables) plus Falco runtime events. Gives the defender view of each path, the audit fields to alert on, a hunt, and RBAC, admission-control, and audit-logging hardening mapped to the UMBRASEC guide. Use when hardening a Kubernetes cluster, reviewing RBAC roles and bindings, designing PodSecurity or Kyverno/Gatekeeper admission policy, tuning API server audit logging, hunting a privileged-pod foothold, or triaging an unexpected clusterrolebinding change or pods/exec event.
umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue · ★ 0 · DevOps & Infrastructure · score 62
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# Kubernetes Cluster Attacks - Defensive Methodology > **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the log sources and signals, and the hardening, and points to public rule sources. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet. ## TL;DR A Kubernetes cluster is a credential and a control plane in one. Most post-compromise damage runs through the API server, so most of the defense is RBAC that grants too little to matter, admission control that refuses the dangerous pod, and an audit log that records every verb. Turn on **API server audit logging** (`--audit-policy-file`, `--audit-log-path`, or the managed-platform equivalent) and watch five things: **permission enumeration** (`SelfSubjectAccessReview` and `SelfSubjectRulesReview`, the `kubectl auth can-i --list` call), **RBAC changes** that bind a subject to `cluster-admin` or the `system:masters` group, **interactive access** to workloads (the `pods/exec` and `pods/attach` subresources), **dangerous pod admission** (`securityContext.privileged`, `hostPID`/`hostNetwork`/`hostIPC`, `hostPath` mounts), and **secret harvesting** (`get`/`list` on `secrets` across namespaces). Harden by stripping wildcard and `cluster-admin` RBAC, disabling automatic servi