harden-mobile-appslisted
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# Mobile App Hardening (Android / iOS) - Defensive Methodology
> **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the log sources and signals, and the hardening, and points to public rule and reference sources. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet.
## TL;DR
A mobile app runs on hardware the attacker owns, so every client-side check can eventually be patched out. The only durable control is to **treat the client as untrusted and enforce trust at the backend through attestation**: have the server require and verify a fresh **Google Play Integrity** token (Android) or **Apple App Attest** assertion (iOS), reject requests that fail, and never let a client-side "device is clean" boolean be the gate. Layer four client-side hardening measures on top as defense in depth, not as the boundary: **TLS certificate or public-key pinning** so a stripped-CA proxy cannot read traffic, **secure storage** in the Android Keystore (StrongBox where present) and iOS Keychain with Secure Enclave rather than shared preferences or plists, **code shrinking and obfuscation** (R8/ProGuard, and a commercial obfuscator for high-value logic) to raise reverse-engineering cost, and **RASP** (root/jailbreak, debugger, emulator, and