harden-tlslisted
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# TLS/SSL Cipher and Protocol Hardening - Defensive Methodology
> **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the config-scan and network signals, and the hardening, and points to public rule and reference sources. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet.
## TL;DR
Most TLS risk is configuration, not a patchable bug. Two moves close the bulk of it. First, **set the floor**: minimum TLS 1.2 (prefer 1.3), restrict to AEAD cipher suites with forward secrecy (ECDHE with AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305), and remove every deprecated protocol (SSLv2, SSLv3, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1) and weak cipher (RC4, 3DES, DES, EXPORT, NULL, anonymous DH). Second, **scan to prove it**: run a config scanner (testssl.sh, sslyze, sslscan, or `nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers`) against your inventory, because a server can still *offer* a weak protocol even if nothing has used it yet. The offer surface is what an attacker downgrades you onto. Pair the scan with network TLS metadata (Zeek `ssl.log`, Suricata tls events, load-balancer access logs) to see what is actually negotiated in production. This skill is defensive: it explains the weaknesses only to the depth needed to find and fix them, and ships no downgrade, interception, pinn