← ClaudeAtlas

harden-windows-boundarieslisted

Defensive hardening methodology for Windows trust boundaries and access tokens: the UAC and integrity-level boundary between medium and high integrity, token theft, duplication, and impersonation, parent-PID spoofing, and Active Directory SID-History injection (MITRE ATT&CK T1134, T1134.001, T1134.002, T1134.003, T1134.004, T1134.005, T1548.002). Signals come from the Windows Security log (4688, 4672, 4673, 4674, 4624, 4648, 4703, 4765, 4766) and Sysmon (EID 1, 10, 13). Gives the events that reveal an illegitimate token or integrity transition, a hunt, rule sources, and a hardening plan for UAC, privilege rights, Credential Guard, and AD trusts. Use when hardening UAC and integrity levels, reviewing SeImpersonatePrivilege or SeDebugPrivilege holders, enabling Credential Guard or lsass PPL, configuring SID filtering on a trust, hunting token-impersonation or SID-History abuse, or closing the medium-to-high integrity gap.
umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue · ★ 0 · Code & Development · score 62
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# Windows Trust-Boundary and Token Hardening - Defensive Methodology > **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's method, the log sources and signals, the hunt, and the hardening, and points to public rule sources. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet. ## TL;DR Windows enforces several trust boundaries that an attacker with a foothold tries to cross without a legitimate elevation: the integrity-level boundary (a medium-integrity user process should not become high or SYSTEM integrity except through a UAC consent prompt), the token boundary (a process should run under its own token, not a duplicated or impersonated copy of a more privileged one), the process-lineage boundary (a child's parent should be its real creator, not a spoofed one), and the Active Directory trust boundary (a principal from one domain should not carry the SIDs of a privileged group in another). The native tell is a cross-token mismatch. Enable **Audit Process Creation** with command line and compare **Event ID 4688** fields: when the new process runs under a different token than its creator, the Target Subject fields (`TargetUserSid`, `TargetUserName`, `TargetLogonId`) are populated, which is the direct signal of create-process