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verify-exploit-mitigationslisted

Verification methodology to prove exploit mitigations are both PRESENT (compiled in and policy-configured) and EFFECTIVE (enforced at runtime, on every loaded module, not silently disabled). Answers the gap attackers rely on: a mitigation a baseline claims is on that is off on the live process. Covers ASLR, DEP/NX, CFG, CET shadow stack, stack canaries, and RELRO. Maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1203, T1190, T1068, T1211, T1210, mitigation M1050, and the tampering it detects (T1685, T1112). Signals: Windows Get-ProcessMitigation configured-vs-running delta, bcdedit nx, MitigationOptions registry, Sysmon 13, Security 4657; Linux randomize_va_space, proc maps, readelf, checksec, systemd-analyze security, auditd. Use when you need to attest ASLR DEP CFG or CET are truly enforced and not just configured, verify every loaded DLL is mitigated not just the main EXE, gate a CI build on hardening flags, or detect a mitigation turned off via IFEO.
umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue · ★ 0 · AI & Automation · score 62
Install: claude install-skill umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue
# Verify Exploit Mitigations (present AND effective) - Defensive Methodology > **Tier 2 - methodology skill.** No bespoke UMBRASEC detection rule ships with this skill yet. It gives the defender's verification method, the log sources and signals, the hunt, and the hardening, and points to public, maintained rule sources by URL. Promotion to Tier 1 (a sourced, tuned UMBRASEC rule) is tracked in [COVERAGE.md](https://github.com/umbrasec-labs/umbra-blue/blob/main/COVERAGE.md). Do not treat the content below as citing a UMBRASEC rule; there is none for this threat yet. This skill is the verification loop that sits beside [defend-exploit-mitigations](../defend-exploit-mitigations/SKILL.md). That sibling owns coverage-gap scanning and crash-cluster hunting for ASLR, DEP, CFG, and CET; do not duplicate it. This skill answers a narrower, sharper question: is the mitigation that your baseline claims is on actually enforced on the running process, on every module it loaded, and has nobody quietly switched it off since. A mitigation that is configured but not effective is worth nothing, and the delta between the two states is where this skill lives. ## TL;DR Treat every mitigation claim as unverified until you have reconciled three states: what the image was compiled with, what policy is configured for it, and what the live process actually enforces. On Windows the single highest-value check is the delta between `Get-ProcessMitigation -Name app.exe` (the configured policy for that i