← ClaudeAtlas

securitylisted

Use for the Fabric security/permission model. Covers the layers (workspace roles Admin/Member/Contributor/Viewer, item-level Read/ReadData/ReadAll, OneLake security data access roles, SQL GRANT/DENY/REVOKE), Admin/Member/Contributor bypass of RLS/CLS/DDM, least-privilege pattern (item share + SQL GRANT; a Viewer already holds ReadData), ReadData vs ReadAll distinction (SQL vs Spark/OneLake), the mode-dependent RLS/CLS enforcement across engines (OneLake security GA May 2026 enforces in Spark/Lakehouse/Direct-Lake-on-OneLake and SQL endpoints in user's-identity mode; the old Spark/OneLake bypass survives only for SQL-defined RLS and delegated-identity-mode endpoints), auto-create of users on GRANT (no CREATE USER), and the 40-warehouses-per-workspace token-size limit.
wardawgmalvicious/claude-plugins · ★ 0 · AI & Automation · score 75
Install: claude install-skill wardawgmalvicious/claude-plugins
# Security model Past this file, `references/REFERENCE.md`, then Learn, by `microsoft-learn-mcp` (`microsoft_docs_search`, then `microsoft_docs_fetch`), or with no server, `curl -sL -H 'Accept: text/markdown' <page URL>` (undocumented, read 2026-11-07). A live page that contradicts a line here wins: say so, act on the page, and route the fix by `capture-learning`, bar a dated measured line that names the page it overrules and the call that measured it, which a page changed since its date sends back to re-measure. An observed claim is cited or marked pending a doc check, and stands, marked observed, only where no page covers it. ## Permission Layers (broadest to finest) 1. **Workspace roles**: Admin, Member, Contributor, Viewer 2. **Item-level permissions**: Read, ReadData, ReadAll 3. **OneLake security data access roles** (GA May 2026): lake-level RBAC — folder + row + column scopes enforced across all Fabric engines (see below) 4. **SQL granular permissions**: GRANT/DENY/REVOKE ## Key Principles - Admin/Member/Contributor roles grant full data read and bypass RLS/CLS/DDM - **A tenant policy can withhold two workspace settings from Admins** without removing the role (preview, Learn 2026-10-31): the *Allow workspace settings editing* policy (`WorkspaceSettingsEditing`, in a `PolicySet` item) governs who may edit customer-managed keys (`Encryption`) and outbound networking (`OutboundNetworking`); a tenant setting still wins over it, and its default effect is `Allow`. Mecha