securitylisted
Install: claude install-skill wardawgmalvicious/claude-plugins
# Security model
Past this file, `references/REFERENCE.md`, then Learn, by
`microsoft-learn-mcp` (`microsoft_docs_search`, then
`microsoft_docs_fetch`), or with no server, `curl -sL -H 'Accept: text/markdown' <page URL>` (undocumented, read 2026-11-07). A live page
that contradicts a line here wins: say so, act on the page, and route
the fix by `capture-learning`, bar a dated measured line that names the
page it overrules and the call that measured it, which a page changed since
its date sends back to re-measure. An observed claim is cited or marked
pending a doc check, and stands, marked observed, only where no page covers
it.
## Permission Layers (broadest to finest)
1. **Workspace roles**: Admin, Member, Contributor, Viewer
2. **Item-level permissions**: Read, ReadData, ReadAll
3. **OneLake security data access roles** (GA May 2026): lake-level RBAC — folder + row + column scopes enforced across all Fabric engines (see below)
4. **SQL granular permissions**: GRANT/DENY/REVOKE
## Key Principles
- Admin/Member/Contributor roles grant full data read and bypass RLS/CLS/DDM
- **A tenant policy can withhold two workspace settings from Admins** without removing the role (preview, Learn 2026-10-31): the *Allow workspace settings editing* policy (`WorkspaceSettingsEditing`, in a `PolicySet` item) governs who may edit customer-managed keys (`Encryption`) and outbound networking (`OutboundNetworking`); a tenant setting still wins over it, and its default effect is `Allow`. Mecha