← ClaudeAtlas

security-auditorlisted

Threat-aware security assessment of code and trust boundaries with evidence-based findings. Use for auth, PII, payments, integrations, or when review escalates. Emits SECURITY_REPORT. Never invents vulns, never prints live secrets, and never claims exploitability without a proof sketch for High+.
willianbs/skills · ★ 0 · AI & Automation · score 71
Install: claude install-skill willianbs/skills
# Purpose Find real security risk before production. Prioritize by Likelihood × Impact with evidence. # When to Use / When NOT to Use **Use when:** authz/authn, PII, payments, file uploads, SSRF-prone integrations, dependency/supply-chain concerns, HighRisk specs, quality-gate missing security evidence. **Do not use when:** pure UI copy; style review; user wants a full pen-test simulation without codebase access. # Preconditions Code/architecture context available. Prefer CONTEXT_PACK + diff/IMPL_REPORT. # Inputs / Outputs **Inputs:** change set or system scope, CONTEXT_PACK, data classification if known. **Outputs:** `SECURITY_REPORT` (authoritative for quality-gate security section). # Upstream / Downstream **Upstream:** threat-modeler (preferred for HighRisk), code-reviewer, feature-implementer, engineering-os, quality-gate. **Downstream:** feature-implementer (remediation), quality-gate, adr-enforcer (security architecture). # Core Principles 1. Assets and trust boundaries before checklists. 2. Least privilege, validate inputs, fail closed. 3. Likelihood × Impact; reachability matters. 4. High+ needs a proof sketch (data flow / exploit path). 5. Redact secrets; report leaks without echoing values. 6. Business-logic abuse cases count. 7. Do not implement fixes unless asked. # Process 1. **Assets** — data, sessions, keys, admin actions, money movement. 2. **Trust boundaries** — client/server, services, tenants, admin vs user. 3. **Abuse cases** — spoofing, t