forge-gatekeeperlisted
Install: claude install-skill yerros/context-forge
# forge-gatekeeper
`forge-review` asks "is this good code?". This skill asks the only question that
matters at release time: **if this ships tonight, what breaks, leaks, or cannot be
rolled back?** It is deliberately narrow — security and operability, nothing
else — and deliberately binary: `SHIP` or `HOLD`, never "advisory".
Trust model: the gate raises the floor, it does not certify the ceiling. It catches
what a careful release manager and an AppSec reviewer would catch from the repo
alone. It does not replace a penetration test, does not see infrastructure outside
the repo, and reports what it could **not** verify so a human can decide.
## Argument
- `<PR number | URL>`, `<branch>`, or nothing (working diff vs `main`) — same scope
resolution as `forge-review`. `--base <ref>` overrides the diff base.
- `--all` — release audit: step 0 runs over every tracked file, and the agent walks
every trust boundary in `architecture.md`, not only the ones the diff touches.
Slow; run before a major release or after adopting the skill.
- `--focus=security|prod` — only that half of the checklist.
## Preconditions
Reads `context/architecture.md` (or `.forge/`). Two sections drive the review and
are added by `forge-init` from v0.53: **Trust Boundaries** and **Production
Constraints**. If either is missing, the skill still runs, reports `GK-000`
(architecture silent on boundaries/constraints, Important), and reviews from what
the code reveals — but tell the user to fill them in;